<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[Executive Policy Briefs: Energy]]></title><description><![CDATA[Policy issues related to energy.]]></description><link>https://www.policyriskreport.com/s/energy</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 10:47:26 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.policyriskreport.com/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[JVM Advisory]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[policyriskreport@substack.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[policyriskreport@substack.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Philip MacFarlane]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Philip MacFarlane]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[policyriskreport@substack.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[policyriskreport@substack.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Philip MacFarlane]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[Policy Brief: G7 Launches Critical Minerals Alliance to Strengthen Supply Chain Security]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Group of Seven (G7) has agreed to establish a new Critical Minerals Alliance and a coordinated crisis-response platform designed to reduce dependence on concentrated suppliers of critical minerals, strengthen Western supply chains, and improve resilience against export restrictions and market disruptions.]]></description><link>https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/policy-brief-g7-launches-critical</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/policy-brief-g7-launches-critical</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Philip MacFarlane]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 27 Jun 2026 03:46:34 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uo3U!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F20f77527-a55c-4352-82e3-c5e3945de539_856x856.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span>The Group of Seven (G7) has agreed to establish a new Critical Minerals Alliance and a coordinated crisis-response platform designed to reduce dependence on concentrated suppliers of critical minerals, strengthen Western supply chains, and improve resilience against export restrictions and market disruptions. The initiative represents one of the most significant multilateral efforts to date to coordinate investment, stockpiling, processing capacity, and supply-chain monitoring for minerals essential to defense, advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and clean energy.</span></p><p><span>For companies, the announcement signals continued government support for domestic mining, mineral processing, recycling, and strategic supply-chain investments. Businesses operating in automotive, battery manufacturing, electronics, aerospace, defense, and energy should expect additional public financing opportunities, tighter supply-chain transparency requirements, and increasing geopolitical competition over critical mineral resources.</span></p><h3><strong><span>The Big Picture</span></strong></h3><p><span>Critical minerals&#8212;including lithium, nickel, rare earth elements, graphite, cobalt, and other strategic metals&#8212;have become central to economic security and national security.</span></p><p><span>Western governments have grown increasingly concerned about concentrated global supply chains, particularly China&#8217;s dominant position in mining, processing, and refining many of these materials. Recent export restrictions and geopolitical tensions have heightened concerns that critical minerals could become tools of economic coercion.</span></p><p><span>The G7 initiative moves beyond individual national strategies by creating coordinated mechanisms for investment, market monitoring, crisis response, and industrial cooperation.</span></p><h3><strong><span>What Happened</span></strong></h3><p><span>At the G7 Summit in France, leaders announced several new initiatives:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>Creation of a Critical Minerals Alliance to coordinate industrial development across member countries.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Establishment of a crisis-response platform, working with the International Energy Agency (IEA), to monitor markets, share data, identify supply disruptions, and provide early warning of market distortions.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Increased coordination among export credit agencies and development finance institutions to finance mining, processing, refining, recycling, and related infrastructure.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Development of harmonized traceability systems beginning with lithium and nickel to improve supply-chain transparency.</span></p></li><li><p><span>A target to reduce dependence on any single non-G7 supplier for rare earths and permanent magnets to below 60% by 2030, with a longer-term ambition of reducing that figure to 50%.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Recognition that nearly 200 critical minerals projects representing approximately &#8364;64 billion in announced investment have already been launched during 2026. (</span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/g7-sets-up-critical-minerals-alliance-crisis-platform-2026-06-17/?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span>Reuters</span></a><span>)</span></p></li></ul><h3><strong><span>Why This Matters</span></strong></h3><p><strong><span>Economic Security</span></strong></p><p><span>The initiative reflects a broader shift toward treating critical mineral supply chains as strategic infrastructure rather than simply commercial markets. Governments increasingly view secure access to critical minerals as essential for maintaining industrial competitiveness and reducing geopolitical vulnerabilities. (</span><a href="https://g7g20-documents.org/database/document/2026-g7-france-leaders-leaders-language-g7-leaders-declaration-on-securing-supply-chains-for-critical-minerals?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span>G7/G20 Documents</span></a><span>)</span></p><p><strong><span>Industrial Policy</span></strong></p><p><span>Rather than relying solely on market forces, G7 governments are signaling greater willingness to coordinate investment, financing, procurement, and industrial development across allied economies.</span></p><p><strong><span>Energy Transition</span></strong></p><p><span>Demand for critical minerals is expected to continue rising as deployment expands for:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>Electric vehicles</span></p></li><li><p><span>Battery storage</span></p></li><li><p><span>Renewable energy</span></p></li><li><p><span>Grid infrastructure</span></p></li><li><p><span>Artificial intelligence data centers</span></p></li><li><p><span>Advanced electronics</span></p></li><li><p><span>Defense technologies</span></p></li></ul><p><span>Building diversified supply chains has become a prerequisite for achieving both energy security and decarbonization objectives.</span></p><h3><strong><span>Business Impact</span></strong></h3><p><strong><span>Mining and Processing</span></strong></p><p><span>Mining companies and mineral processors could benefit from expanded government financing, loan guarantees, and export-credit support for projects located within G7 countries and trusted partner nations.</span></p><p><strong><span>Manufacturing</span></strong></p><p><span>Manufacturers may gain more diversified sources of supply over time, reducing exposure to geopolitical disruptions. However, additional reporting and traceability requirements could increase compliance obligations.</span></p><p><strong><span>Automotive and Battery Companies</span></strong></p><p><span>Automakers and battery manufacturers are likely to see increased incentives to secure long-term supply agreements, diversify suppliers, and invest in recycling capacity.</span></p><p><strong><span>Technology and Defense</span></strong></p><p><span>Semiconductor, electronics, aerospace, and defense firms may benefit from improved access to strategically important minerals but should expect continued scrutiny of sourcing practices.</span></p><h3><strong><span>Macro Impact</span></strong></h3><p><span>The initiative reinforces several broader trends:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>Expansion of industrial policy among advanced economies.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Continued movement toward &#8220;friend-shoring&#8221; and allied supply chains.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Greater public-sector involvement in strategic commodity markets.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Increased competition with China over critical mineral production, processing, and technology.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Higher investment in refining, recycling, and downstream manufacturing outside traditional supply centers.</span></p></li></ul><p><span>While diversification will likely improve long-term resilience, developing new mines and processing facilities typically requires years of permitting and construction, meaning supply constraints could persist in the near term. (</span><a href="https://g7g20-documents.org/database/document/2026-g7-france-leaders-leaders-language-g7-leaders-declaration-on-securing-supply-chains-for-critical-minerals?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span>G7/G20 Documents</span></a><span>)</span></p><h3><strong><span>What Companies Should Do</span></strong></h3><p><span>Companies with exposure to critical minerals should consider:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>Reviewing supply-chain concentration and geopolitical risk.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Diversifying suppliers where feasible.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Evaluating opportunities to participate in government-supported critical mineral projects.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Monitoring evolving traceability and sourcing requirements.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Assessing long-term procurement strategies, including recycling and secondary supply.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Incorporating critical mineral risks into broader enterprise risk management and capital investment planning.</span></p></li></ul><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Energy Brief: Trump Directs Federal Financial Support to Increase Energy Production]]></title><description><![CDATA[Trump directed federal financial support toward oil, gas, coal, and grid infrastructure, marking a shift from regulatory acceleration to direct industrial intervention in energy markets.]]></description><link>https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/energy-brief-trump-directs-federal-fb9</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/energy-brief-trump-directs-federal-fb9</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Philip MacFarlane]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 21:54:42 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/03d02ba7-b879-4071-867e-c1d8f2cd0999_960x720.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On April 20, 2026, President Donald Trump invoked the Defense Production Act of 1950 to direct federal financial support toward oil, gas, coal, and grid infrastructure, marking a shift from regulatory acceleration to direct industrial intervention in energy markets. The administration&#8217;s use of the Defense Production Act to increase energy production is a material escalation in federal industrial policy. The move creates near-term opportunities for energy and infrastructure investment aligned with national security priorities, but introduces legal and political risks and uncertainty around long-term policy direction.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.policyriskreport.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.policyriskreport.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Energy Brief: Treasury Eliminates 5% Safe Harbor for Solar and Wind]]></title><description><![CDATA[New Treasury Department guidance made it more difficult for wind and solar projects to be eligible for energy tax credits repealed under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act.]]></description><link>https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/treasury-eliminates-5-safe-harbor</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/treasury-eliminates-5-safe-harbor</guid><pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2025 01:21:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/90b2eadc-7067-4d2b-be58-f5ff15fb4ca9_800x539.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>New Treasury Department <a href="https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-25-42.pdf">guidance</a> made it more difficult for wind and solar projects to be eligible for energy tax credits <a href="https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/obbba-repeals-energy-tax-credits">repealed</a> under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. The beginning construction requirement under the energy tax credits for wind and solar projects will depend on work actually performed rather than on costs. The rules apply to projects that begin construction on or after September 2, 2025 through July 4, 2026.</p><p><strong>Key Changes</strong></p><ul><li><p>Eliminates the &#8220;5% safe harbor&#8221; for the Section 45Y clean electricity production tax credit (PTC) and the Section 48E investment tax credit (ITC) for all wind projects and for solar projects of more than 1.5 megawatts (MW).</p></li><li><p>Leaves in place the tougher &#8220;physical work&#8221; test, which considers the amount of work done on a project.</p></li><li><p>Implements strict continuity rules.</p></li></ul><p><strong>Guidance Determines 2027 Deadline</strong></p><p>OBBB repealed the PTC and ITC for wind and solar projects unless they are placed in service by the end of 2027. In July, President Trump issued an <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/ending-market-distorting-subsidies-for-unreliable-foreign%E2%80%91controlled-energy-sources/">executive order</a> titled &#8220;Ending Market Distorting Subsidies for Unreliable, Foreign-Controlled Energy Sources,&#8221; which directed the Treasury to issue guidance to determine whether a project began or is subject to the December 31, 2027 deadline.</p><ul><li><p><strong>Began construction after July 4, 2026:</strong> Wind and solar projects that have not started construction by July 4, 2026 must be in service by the end of 2027 to qualify for the tax credits.</p></li><li><p><strong>Began construction by July 4, 2026:</strong> Wind and solar projects that began construction before July 4, 2026 can be placed in service after 2027.</p></li></ul><p><strong>&#8220;Physical Work&#8221; Replaces 5% Safe Harbor</strong></p><ul><li><p>Under the 5% safe harbor, a project begins construction when the taxpayer pays or incurs 5% or more of the total cost of the facility.</p></li><li><p>Now, a developer must have performed &#8220;physical work of a significant nature,&#8221; which is determined under a &#8220;facts-and-circumstances&#8221; approach.</p></li></ul><p><strong>Types of &#8220;Physical Work&#8221;</strong></p><p>Both off-site and onsite work can be used to demonstrate that physical work of a significant nature has begun. Qualifying work includes:</p><ul><li><p>Off-site work may include the manufacture of components, mounting equipment, support structures such as racks and rails, inverters, and transformers and other power conditioning equipment;</p></li><li><p>On-site work for wind projects may include such activities as the excavation for the foundation, the setting of anchor bolts into the ground, or the pouring of the concrete pads of the foundation. On-site work for solar projects may include the installation of racks or other structures to affix photovoltaic (PV) panels, collectors, or solar cells to a site.</p></li><li><p>Physical work of a significant nature does not include preliminary activities, including planning, designing, permitting, site clearing, financing, and warehousing.</p></li></ul><p><strong>September 2, 2025 Deadline</strong></p><ul><li><p>Given that the rules apply to projects that begin construction on or after September 2, 2025, wind and solar projects can start construction before September 2, 2025 by beginning physical work of a significant nature or by incurring 5% of project costs.</p></li></ul><p><strong>Continuity Requirements</strong></p><ul><li><p>If an applicable wind or solar facility is not placed in service within four years, the project developer will have to show continuous construction to be allowed more time to finish the project.</p></li><li><p>Disruptions such as weather delays, permitting, supply chain shortages, and labor stoppages are allowed.</p></li><li><p>Whether a taxpayer maintains a continuous program of construction to satisfy the Continuity Requirement will be determined by the relevant facts and circumstances.</p></li></ul><p><strong>Rooftop Solar Exclusion</strong></p><p>The changes apply to utility-scale solar and provide a significant exclusion for smaller solar facilities, such as rooftop solar for homes and businesses. Solar projects with a maximum net output of 1.5 MWs or less can continue to claim the 5% safe harbor if they begin construction after September 2, 2025, and before July 4, 2026.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.policyriskreport.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption"><em>Policy Risk Report</em> is a publication of <a href="https://jvmadvisory.com/">JVM Research &amp; Advisory Services</a>.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Energy Brief: OBBBA Repeals Energy Tax Credits]]></title><description><![CDATA[On July 4, 2025, President Trump signed into law the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBB), which largely repeals the energy tax credits enacted under the Inflation Reduction Act.]]></description><link>https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/obbba-repeals-energy-tax-credits</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/obbba-repeals-energy-tax-credits</guid><pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2025 00:36:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/3268b5a7-3707-4ef6-856e-fbb4ba9581f1_1280x856.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On July 4, 2025, President Trump signed into law the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/1/text">One Big Beautiful Bill Act</a> (OBBB), which largely repeals the energy tax credits enacted under the Inflation Reduction Act. The law does this by accelerating phase-outs and expiration dates, prohibiting transfers of credits, and implementing new restrictions for companies that have associations with a foreign entity of concern (FEOC). Notably, the final legislation did not include a controversial excise tax of up to 50% for wind and 30% for solar investments that exceed a &#8220;material assistance&#8221; cost ratio for materials obtained from certain foreign entities.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.policyriskreport.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.policyriskreport.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>Below are the key changes to the major energy tax provisions.</p><ul><li><p><strong>Clean vehicle tax credits: </strong>The law accelerates the expiration of the &#8220;clean vehicle&#8221; tax credits for electric vehicles (EVs) to 2025 and 2026 from 2032.</p></li><li><p><strong>Residential energy efficiency credits:</strong> The law also accelerates the expiration of residential energy tax credits to 2025 and 2026.</p></li><li><p><strong>Technology-neutral tax credits:</strong> The OBBBA phases out the &#167;45Y and &#167;48E clean electricity production and investment credits beginning in 2034. The production and investment credits for wind and solar is repealed unless the project is placed in service before 2028. If the wind or solar project is placed in service after 2027, construction must begin before July 4, 2026.</p></li><li><p><strong>Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC):</strong> The law expands the FEOC rules to restrict credit availability to taxpayers that are FEOC or receive material assistance from FEOCs.</p></li><li><p><strong>Carbon capture:</strong> The law implements the foreign entity rules for the &#167;45Q carbon oxide sequestration credit. It also repeals transferability for facilities that begin construction two years from the bill&#8217;s enactment.</p></li><li><p><strong>Clean fuels:</strong> The law extends the Section 45Z clean fuel production credit through December 31, 2029, from the current expiration at the end of 2027.</p></li><li><p><strong>Credits transfers: </strong>The law retains the ability of entities to transfer credits but prohibits transfers to prohibited FEOCs or entities that receive material assistance from prohibited FEOCs.</p></li></ul><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.policyriskreport.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption"><em>Policy Risk Report</em> is a publication of <a href="https://jvmadvisory.com/">JVM Research &amp; Advisory Services</a>.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Comparison of Changes to Energy Tax Credits in House and Senate Bills]]></title><link>https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/comparison-of-changes-to-energy-tax</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/comparison-of-changes-to-energy-tax</guid><pubDate>Wed, 18 Jun 2025 20:41:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!6xVd!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F098a5f11-9e74-45f0-a657-9405f1c7aeb9_1260x660.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Energy Brief: Trump Executive Orders Reshape U.S. Energy Policy]]></title><description><![CDATA[On January 20, 2025, President Donald Trump issued a series of executive orders and memorandums that begin implementation of his policy agenda.]]></description><link>https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/trump-executive-orders-reshape-us</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/trump-executive-orders-reshape-us</guid><pubDate>Fri, 24 Jan 2025 00:01:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/4134aa58-c52d-4579-94d2-0d3ebeadff64_600x600.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On January 20, 2025, President Donald Trump issued a <a href="https://www.policyriskreport.com/p/trump-executive-orders-key-policy">series of executive orders</a> and memorandums that begin implementation of his policy agenda. For energy, he issued three executive orders and a memorandum to direct U.S. energy policy toward a prioritization of deregulation in the fossil fuel sector and away from support for renewable energy.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.policyriskreport.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.policyriskreport.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>The executi&#8230;</p>
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